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The Centrality of Beliefs in Strategy 
It goes almost without saying that beliefs must be crucial to the enterprise of 
strategy. Thus, beliefs are central to the phenomenon of entrepreneurship 
(individual and corporate), clearly an important part of how competitive 
advantages are created and maintained. The ambitious notion of “vision”  as 
propagated by Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad (1994)  refers to corporate 
beliefs and how these may help molding future competitive landscapes.  Shorter-
run aspects of strategizing, such as signaling tactics, are also ultimately rooted in 
what you believe about your competitors, what they believe about you, what you 
believe that they believe about you, etc. (Ghemawat 1991). And the outcomes of 
bargaining with, for example, your suppliers or employees also depend very 
much on the beliefs you and your suppliers or employees hold.   
 In fact, according to an important argument (Barney 1986), the very 
phenomenon of competitive advantage  the fundamental subject of strategy  
is ultimately a matter of beliefs.  Thus, only if the buyer of a resource has superior 
information regarding the uses (and hence value) of the resource may he be able 
to acquire the resource at a price below the discounted net present value of that 
resource  and hence earn a rent from the deployment of the resource.  The core 
of the argument is that buyers and sellers may hold different beliefs with respect 
to the value-creating potential of the resource, and that your superior insight, or 
luck, may help you to exploit those differences.  A fairly well known example 
concerns the initial sources of Microsoft wealth creation which was very much 
based on landing a lucrative contract with IBM for an operating system (which 
MS still had to develop) and then discovering a small developer of OS whose 
product was acquired for the (comparatively) miniscule sum of 50.000 USD, 
keeping the IBM contract entirely secret.   
 Because beliefs are so obviously central to strategy, and underlies its central 
phenomenon, one would expect the formal study of belief management to 
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constitute the central core of strategy.  This is not the case.  Apart from a few 
contributions (Barney 1986; Phelan 2000), beliefs have been given surprisingly 
little attention in the  strategy literature.  To be sure game theorists, 
psychologists, marketing specialists, etc. are taken up with beliefs, how they are 
formed, how they interact, how they may be influenced.  Strategists aren’t.  
Rather, strategists are instructed to utilize the information that they, and no (or 
only few) others, possess in order to be able to utilize possible divergences in the 
beliefs about the true values of resources on factor markets.  This is taking the 
beliefs of others to be given, and hence unchanging.  Perhaps this reflects a belief 
that beliefs cannot be molded or manipulated (or, if this can be done, that this is 
the task of marketing people rather than strategists) or that beliefs are just 
inherently too flimsy, unpredictable, vague, etc. to be something you can 
successfully influence in your favor.  
  I hope in this paper to mold and manipulate these particular beliefs.  Thus, 
I shall argue that the ability to influence beliefs will increasingly be a central 
strategic capability. It will be one that goes significantly beyond the marketing 
function (although it will bring marketing and strategy closer together); it will be 
central to managing supply networks, to influencing customers and users; and it 
will be the key to managing employees. In particular, that capability will become 
important as a key source of wealth creation as we become increasingly 
immersed in an economy that is not only knowledge-based, but network-based 
(Kelly 1999; Tapscott 1999; Varian and Shapiro 1999).  In this economy, firms will 
increasingly become confronted with what economists and game theorists call 
“coordination problems” that arise for various reasons, primary among which 
are “network effects.”  In these situations, the ability to influence beliefs is often 
crucial, in ways that will be detailed,  explained and illustrated for the remaining 
part of this paper.  
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The Argument: An Example 
To get an intuitive idea of the argument, consider the following story as told by 
Kevin Kelly, the executive editor of Wired. Kelly (1999) recounts participating in 
1995 in a computer graphics conference organized by Loren Carpenter where one 
of the events consisted in having all 5.000 attendees simultaneously operating a 
submarine simulator.  Thus, the challenge for the 5.000 co-pilots, each one 
equipped with their own joystick  
… was to steer a submarine through a 3D undersea world to capture 
some sea monster eggs.  … The sub could go up/down, open claws, 
close claws, and so on … when the audience first took command of the 
submarine, nothing happened.  Audience members wiggled this 
control and that, shouted and counter-shouted instructions to one 
another, but nothing moved.  Each person’s instructions were being 
canceled by another person’s orders.  The was no cohesion.  The sub 
didn’t budge.  
 Finally Loren Carpenter’s voice boomed from a loudspeaker in 
the back of the room. “Why don’t you guys go to the right?,” he 
hollered. Click! Instantly the sub zipped of to the right. With emergent 
coordination the audience adjusted the details of sailing and smoothly 
set off in search of sea monster eggs. 
What is going on here? Well, to put in analytical terms Mr. Carpenter is 
exercising cognitive leadership aiming at coordinating the complementary actions of 
many people through the creation of common knowledge.  The argument of this 
paper essentially is that the ability to exercise this kind of leadership is becoming 
increasingly important as our economy becomes increasingly networked. Let us 




Fundamentally, belief management will become important is because firms in a 
network economy to an ever larger extent will face what economists and game 
theorists call “coordination problems.”  To understand what a coordination 
problem is about, consider Figure 1a. 
XXXXXXXX Insert Figure 1 Here XXXXXXXX 
The 2x2 matrix in figure 1a maps a “coordination game” that involves two 
“players,” A(rthur) and B(rian), who both have two available “strategies,” here 
simply called “1” and “2.”  They choose and exercise one of these strategies not 
knowing which strategy the other player will choose and exercise (they are not 
allowed to communicate).  We may associate strategy 1 with choosing one kind 
of interface standard for an electronic widget that Arthur and Brian are 
producing, while strategy 2 is associated with another interface standard  Their 
behavior (i.e., their choice and execution of certain strategies) is interdependent, 
resulting in the “pay-offs” that are shown in the matrix.  The matrix shows that it 
doesn’t matter which interface standard they choose, as long as they choose the 
same one.  There are thus two (symmetric) (Nash) “equilibria” in this game, that 
is, situations where neither Arthur nor Brian has an incentive to change their 
behavior, given what the other player does.  If they don’t succeed in coordinating 
on an equilibrium, they will realize zero profits.   
 Now let us complicate it a bit; say, one of the standards may actually be 
better than the other one. This is pictured in Figure 1b.  Clearly, the standard 
associated with Arthur and Brian both choosing and executing strategy 2 is better 
than that associated with strategy 1. In fact, their interdependent strategies are 
“complements.”  Thus, Arthur picking strategy 2 complements Brian picking 
strategy 2.   So, will they both choose strategy 2, given that they don’t know what 
the other player will choose?  The intuition is that they will, because it is 
“obviously” in their mutual interest to do so.  The problem is that this intuition is 
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not necessarily correct.  In fact, in experiments, although the majority does 
coordinate on the standard that is associated with the high payoffs, not all 
players do.  Why?  Because there is an element of risk: How can you be 
absolutely sure that the other player is completely rational  and, even if he is, 
how do you know that he knows that you know that he is completely rational?  
Back to Figure 1, namely figure 1c.  Here the risk element is pretty evident, and 
larger than in figure 1b.  For example, if Arthur plays strategy 1, he gets a payoff 
of 1 regardless of whether Brian plays strategy 1 or strategy 2.   Same for Brian.  
Intuitively, this makes it hard for them to coordinate on the (2,2) equilibrium.  
There is experimental evidence that it is, in fact, very hard for experimental 
subjects in games such as this to coordinate on the “best” (i.e., “Pareto optimal) 
equilibrium. Most pairs (such as Arthur and Brian) fail to coordinate.  Players 
evidently believe that it is too risky to play strategy 2.  Thus, their mutual beliefs 
lead them to play the inferior equilibrium (1,1).  
 In these situations, communication often helps a lot; in fact, in the stylized 
settings of the experimental game theorist, two-way communication makes 
everybody coordinate on the optimal equilibrium.  But still, there are many 
situations where players for various reasons cannot communicate.  Or, there are 
so many players that communicating is extremely costly, or complex, or both, as 
in Loren Carpenter’s computer graphics conference where “[a]udience members 
wiggled this control and that, shouted and counter-shouted instructions to one 
another, but nothing moved.  Each person’s instructions were being canceled by 
another person’s orders.” Sometimes so-called “focal points” help players 
coordinate their strategies.  Thus, there are certain strategies  for example, 
about where to meet with your friends  that “comes natural.” But in many 
situations, there are no obvious focal points.   In those cases where pair-by-pair 
communication is costly or where there are no obvious focal points, something 
else may substitute, namely the willed creation of “common knowledge” 
conditions, that is, belief management of a certain kind.  
 5
Common Knowledge and Cognitive Leadership 
The argument that common knowledge may be crucial to resolving coordination 
games and that a number of important real world phenomena, such as rituals 
and leadership, may exist partly because they create common knowledge 
conditions was recently put forward by Michael Chwe (2001) and myself (Foss 
2001).  One way to introduce the argument is to think about what is implied in 
the notion of focal point that was just mentioned.  Why is it that a particular 
place, say, a bar, may solve the coordination problem that you and your friends 
confront when you have agreed to meet at a certain time, but unfortunately 
forgot to make an agreement about where you would meet?  In other words, in 
which way does a focal point influence beliefs?  Clearly, sometimes it is as if a 
focal point works its effects automatically; you “just do it.”  However, if asked 
you may reply that you choose a particular strategy, because you are convinced 
that the other players, those with whom you wish to coordinate your actions, will 
also play the focal point strategy.  And if you think further about it, you may 
realize that you also (albeit implicitly) rely on your friends knowing that you 
know that they will pick the focal point strategy, and that you know that they 
know that you know, etc. ... that they will pick the focal point strategy. 
 Thus, something (an event, a fact …) is common knowledge among a group 
of players if each player knows it, each one knows that the other players know it, 
each player knows that other players know that the other players know it, and so 
on.  This may sound too extreme to have any relation to the practical world, for it 
seems to require that interactive belief making foes on to an infinite degree, that 
is, that the sequence of “I know that you know that I know that…” is infinite.  
However, as Chwe (2001) points out, in everyday interaction we often succeed in 
shortcutting the regress, as it were.  The classic example is eye contact which 
means that “… I don’t have to think through anything; I can simply infer from 
past experience that usually when we make eye contact, common knowledge is 
formed” (Chwe 2001: 77).  Focal point coordination implies much the same: 
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When there is a focal point, you don’t have to think through anything; you can 
just play the focal point strategy.  And the actions of a charismatic leader (Foss 
2001) may have the same effect; for example, think of Kevin Kelly’s story of how 
coordination was finally achieved when “Loren Carpenter’s voice boomed from a 
loudspeaker in the back of the room. “Why don’t you guys go to the right?,” he 
hollered.”  
 In a number of industries of the present and the future, increasingly the 
ability to effect this kind of “cognitive leadership” (Foss 2001) will be a key 
capability.  There are two aspects to this, an external and an internal. The first one 
concerns coordinating the actions of customers and complementors, such as 
suppliers (for space reasons I concentrate on consumers); the second concerns the 
internal organization of firms.    
Coordination in the Networked, Information-Rich Economy 
It has often been said that our emerging economy is an increasingly information 
rich one.  That is no doubt true.  But the flip-side of this information-richness, 
increasing connectivity, is usually given less attention.  Yet, it is everywhere, 
from the linking of primitive cash-registers into smart inventory management 
systems to the amazing connectivity we can observe on the internet.  Another 
word for “connectivity” is “network,” although connectivity goes way beyond 
those industries that have traditionally been considered “network industries,” 
such as telecom, operating systems and the like.   
 Now, as we have increasingly realized networks have their own logics, and 
to the extent that our economy is becoming more and more networked, theirs is 
the logic that business will have to obey.  A dominant aspect of that logic is 
emergence, that is, qualitatively new, sometimes “smart,” phenomena arise from 
the interaction of many, sometimes “dumb,” parts.  Of course, this is a 
phenomenon with which economists have always been familiar, as Friedrich von 
Hayek (1988) used to point out.  Take a billion individually quite limited persons, 
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let them produce and exchange within a framework of secure property rights  
and get the incredible collective intelligence embodied in the market system!   
 However, what is arguably new is that connectivity leading to networks 
introduces new dimensions to this old insight.  Most notably, it introduces critical 
mass in a number of ways, notably through ”network externalities”, that is, you 
are more likely to buy a certain product if others also buy it because your utility 
of the product is an increasing function of the number of others who buy it (think 
of fax machines).   And whereas the “agent” in the economists traditional market 
model can act in a more less autonomous manner, this is not the case in a 
networked economy.  Actions become increasingly interdependent; they become 
“strategies” in our earlier terminology.  This means that coordination problems of 
the kind we have just considered are becoming increasingly visible.   
 In this situation, it may not necessarily be a good idea to leave everything to 
the spontaneous forces of the network. I don’t have in mind public policy here.  
Rather, the point is that without some kind of governance, however minimal, 
agents (consumers and firms) may not be able to home in on the solution to the 
coordination problem that they prefer.  In particular, firms offering products that 
involve coordination problem features must realize that for such products “… 
success and failure are driven as much by consumer expectations and luck as by 
the underlying value of the product” ( Shapiro and Varian 1997: 181).  While luck 
cannot be directly influenced, consumer expectations can.  In this situation, firms 
may benefit from taking in the form of assuming cognitive leadership (Foss 2001).  
In fact, in a networked economy, leading customers, rather than just following 
them (Hamel and Prahalad 1991), is an increasingly important capability.  Here is 
how it works. 
Organizing Consumption 
To be able to consume in an intelligent manner, you have to be able to rank the 
consumption alternatives you confront, process available information, 
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understand why and how various goods and services produce utility for you, 
and compute what you can afford to buy.  The conventional assumption  
certainly in economics, but to some extent also in marketing  is that once given 
sufficient information in the form of advertising, the consumer can easily and 
autonomously choose his most-preferred, “utility maximizing” bundle of goods.  
In the perfect competition model so beloved of many economists, the consumer 
need to know the menu of available goods, the prices of these goods, his own 
preferences (which are of course “given”) and his own wealth.  Knowing all of 
the goods in the economy is already mind-boggling. But there is one thing, this 
consumer doesn’t have to do, namely care at all about the consumption choices of 
other consumers. He doesn’t need to, since all interaction effects that are not 
transmitted through the price system are squeezed out of this model.   Moreover, 
he knows exactly how the various goods and services that he may purchase 
produce utility for him.  His “consumption capabilities” (Langlois and Cosgel 
1998) are perfect.  
 In more realistic settings, such as our increasingly networked economy, 
consumers are not likely to come equipped with such perfect consumption 
capabilities.  Moreover, everything is not somehow mysteriously organized for 
the consumer (or user) so that all he must do is picking his preferred bundle.  
Think of how beer drinkers now organize to influence the traditional breweries to 
produce higher quality beers. Or the role of the hobbyists in the development of 
the emerging PC industry, and, in general, how much of innovation activity is 
really a matter of interaction between users and producers. Or think of how 
much of advertising is really educating you as a consumer not only about prices 
and where to get the goods, but also about how products fit with each other, how 
you will “fit” with all other buyers once you have purchased the product, or how 
 ironically, and ultimately self-defeating  how you will not fit with the other 
consumers, if you buy a certain product.  In all these cases, you are being 
educated about how consumption pattern may fit into the consumption patterns 
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of other consumers.  Sometimes, this is done in less than subtle ways (“50 million 
Americans can’t be wrong” etc.), but often it is done in very subtle ways indeed.   
 A particularly subtle example, discovered and interpreted by Michael Chwe 
(2001), is Super Bowl advertising.  The Super Bowl is the most popular program 
on network television that occurs regularly.  It is likely to be seen my a majority 
of American households.  In fact, any American household is likely to know that 
a majority of other households have seen it.  The super bowl, in other words, is 
one giant common knowledge generator.   Now, if you check, as Chwe did, what 
kind of products are typically advertised on the Super Bowl transmission, it is 
products such as the Macintosh, the Discover card, Chrysler’s Neon automobile 
and various Nike and Reebok athletic shoes.  Is there anything special about such 
goods?  Yes, indeed: buying each one of them constitutes a coordination problem.  
In fact, Chwe talks about “coordination goods” as a separate category of products.  
 Imagine that you are back in 1984.  Why does buying a Macintosh constitute 
a coordination problem for you?  Well, the answer is of course that when you 
consider buying a Macintosh, you want as many others to buy a Mac as well, for 
reasons of being able to exchange programs, documents, games, etc. This is the 
network externality.  Your problem is that you don’t know whether a sufficient 
number of other buyers will in fact buy a Mac; you don’t know whether there 
will be “critical mass.”  Enter the Super Bowl transmission.  As a potential Mac 
buyer, at least this will make you know that other potential Mac buyers have 
seen the Mac ad.  In fact, this goes for any potential Mac buyer who has seen the 
Super Bowl transmission.  In other words, common knowledge is established.   
 Now, coordination goods may possess this quality for various reasons.  
Thus, in some cases, you are really only interested in connectivity and a large 
network for purely technical reasons.  In other cases, such as those of Nike or 
Reebok athletic shoes, technical complementarity has very little to do with your 
purchasing decisions.   Rather, consumers purchase such goods because they are 
interested in having others form certain beliefs about them, for example, that 
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they, too, are members of a certain in-group.  Thus, consumption may in itself 
carry information and reduce uncertainty. Or, consumers are having their 
preferences  their ranking of the goods they can purchase  influenced by the 
number and character of other purchasers, quite apart from considerations of 
expediency.  Purchase may be purely a matter of snobbism.  However, in all these 
cases, consumers face a coordination problem.  And in all of these cases, 
establishing common knowledge may be key to having the consumers solve their 
coordination problems  and to firms having success.   Some firms, if certainly 
not all, are acutely aware of this. A striking example was an increasingly 
squeezed WordPerfect filing a court complaint against Microsoft to make the 
court stop the Microsoft claim that Word was the globally most popular software 
for word-processing purposes.  nother example is Netscape’s Navigator 
campaign which revolved around slogan, “Netscape Everywhere.”  
 One of the implications of saying that the emerging economy is becoming 
increasingly networked is that products and services with the above 
characteristics will constitute an increasing part of the total of the goods that is on 
offer in the economy. This goes for OEM markets as well as consumers’ markets.  
Therefore, firms in the network economy needs to understand the logic behind 
networks.  The implications for business of the networked economy has certainly 
not gone unnoticed. Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian’s masterful Information Rules 
(1999) is testimony to that.  However, quite a number of those implications have 
not been unfolded.  In particular, the importance of influencing beliefs have not 
been seriously investigated.   Here are some of those implications:  
 Understand the nature of your product.  To be sure, not all goods as in the 
nature of coordination goods.  For example,  paper clips or baking soda really 
aren’t. However, an amazing number of goods are in actuality coordination 
goods, even if you don’t always realize this.  An example is oil for your car.  
Another one, perhaps more obvious, is paper for your copying machine.  There 
isn’t necessarily anything fancy about coordination goods.  However, although 
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car oil and paper for copying machines are indeed coordination goods, they are 
also goods for which standards are fairly well established.  This means that it is 
likely that your investments are likely to be substantial if you consider 
introducing a new standard for extremely well-established products, although it 
can be done, as the example of the DVD suggests. In some cases (e.g., copying 
paper) you may have to introduce a whole new system (e.g., copying machines, 
after sales service, etc.)  to compete with existing suppliers.  This is in most cases 
a hopeless task, simply because you are up against too much “installed base.” 
You have a better chance of accomplishing successful belief management in 
connection with launching coordination goods that are genuinely new and which 
are not necessarily complementary to a lot of other products.  An obvious 
example is athletic shoes.   So are movies.  
 Understand the nature of your audience.  This is not quite the same as 
understanding the nature of your product, although to a certain extent they are 
two sides of the same coin.  What is meant is that you need to understand their 
motives for buying your products before you can hope to be able to manage their 
beliefs.   Consumers who contemplate buying a product for snobbish reasons 
need to be talked to in a way that is different from the way in which you talk to 
consumers who contemplate buying a product because they hope to achieve 
technological complementarity with numerous other consumers.  Louis Vuitton 
doesn’t use Super Bowl advertising.   
 Simplicity is of the Essence. Karl Weick (1979: 164) argued that as a general 
matter, managers engage in processes of “enactment,” whereby they “… 
construct, rearrange, single out, and demolish many ‘objective’ features of their 
surroundings.  They unrandomize variables [and] insert vestiges of orderliness.” 
Enactment, in Weick’s description, is essentially making order by means of 
simplification that helps agents to construct shared understandings with which 
they can interpret reality and act in a cohesive way.  While Weick had 
organizational action in mind, our argument so far implies that firms should try 
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to enact their external environment, not just for themselves, but just as much for 
their customers.  One important means of trying to establish common knowledge 
is indeed through emphasizing simplicity.  A classic example that pertains to a 
coordination product is movies, specifically the very different ads for Steven 
Spielberg’s Jaws and Robert Altman’s Nashville, both from 1975 (Chwe 2001: 81).  
While the Jaws poster showed little more than a swimming (and naked) woman 
and a shark, the Nashville poster showed the whole 24 characters cast emblazoned 
on the back of a blue denim jacket.  The simpler poster is likely to be noticed and 
remembered by many more than the more complicated poster.  It is therefore 
more likely to help creating common knowledge. 
 Use Waporware.  One way in which you may influence beliefs in your 
market place is through aggressively engaging in pre-launch tactics, such as 
massively announcing new soon-to-be-marketed products.  The interesting thing 
about this tactic is that it not only may help you gain lead time in the process of 
building critical mass for your coordination good; it may also help you deter 
your competitors.  
 Get Allies. Use alliances with other (complementor) firms to credibly signal 
that your product will become or already is popular.  For example, Sun engaged 
in such belief management when it ran full-page ads in support of Java that listed 
all participants in the Java coalition (Shapiro and Varian 1999: 276).  Another 
example is the promotion of Ethernet by the DIX (Digital, Intel and Xerox) 
alliance.  However, the alliance signal is not restricted to cases involving 
technological standards.  In any situation involving a coordination good, allies 
may help you ignite the positive feedback that means increased revenues for you.  
Common Knowledge and the Organization of Firms 
Not only is the emergence of the networked, information-rich economy bringing 
about profound changes in the external environments of firms, it has also strong 
implications for how managers and owners decide to organize firms (see 
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Tapscott 1999).  Thus, traditional “Taylorist” authority in the sense of detailed 
order-giving and control is waning in importance, as knowledge workers 
increasingly control strategically important assets, have attractive exit options, 
and are anyway increasingly difficult to monitor and control, because of their 
expert knowledge. Traditional hierarchy and supervision is giving way to 
empowerment, delegation, and autonomy and disintegrating into molecular 
team-based units.  
 However, firms still often needs to make concerted actions.  They also need 
to share knowledge, for example, for the purpose of making such concerted 
action.  It is not immediately clear how firms can fulfill these aims at the same 
time that they are restructuring their organizations towards much more 
decentralized structures.   Corporate cohesion seems threatened in the face of the 
centrifugal forces of decentralization.  As a consequence of this, more and more 
firms are working not only on installing shared value bases, but also at 
knowledge management exercises that are intended to compensate for (and 
more) those communication channels that decentralization may have 
demolished.   However, they often fail to do it in the right way.  Insights in 
coordination problems and common knowledge show us why. 
 Although corporate value bases are all the rage in these years, many, many 
firms communicate these value bases in a surprisingly naïve manner.  Often the 
initial training sessions is the only time during her career in which an employee 
is explicitly exposed to the corporate value base.  Such an exercise is, at best, 
useless.  For corporate value bases to help assisting in internal coordination tasks, 
they have to be in the nature of what Danish marketing executive-turned-guru, 
Jesper Kunde (1997), strikingly calls “corporate religion.”   
 Though perhaps a bit tasteless (at least to the believer), the religion 
metaphor is nevertheless descriptively most apposite.  This is because a living 
religion is not the Holy Scriptures per se, but is the lived practice and the feeling 
of community implied by and revolving around those scriptures.  Most religions 
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thus consider active participation in the community, including participating in 
services, essential.  Common knowledge helps us to understand why this is so. 
Thus, common knowledge is best established through being physically present at 
the same location and, if possible, by having eye contact.  Rituals perform much 
of this function (Chwe 2001).  Corporate value bases is not something that only 
should be communicated from a HRM manager to a prospective or new 
employee; it is something that is meant for large-scale relatively frequent 
(perhaps yearly) gatherings, involving as of the firm’s employees as possible, 
allowing for eye contact and other aspects of bodily language.  This is the way to 
maximize the chances that any employee knows that any other employee knows 
that any given action is or is not in conformity with corporate values, with “the 
way we do it ‘round here”; something which we have seen is a great assisting 
force in resolving coordination problems.  
 In this connection, note that while Taylorist authority may indeed be 
waning in the information-rich, networked economy, this is not the case for what 
Max Weber called “charismatic authority.”  The successful charismatic leader is 
not only the one who makes each individual believe in the real existence of a 
common purpose; he also succeeds in making all those he lead believe that 
everybody believes in this common purpose.   This kind of authority is certainly a 
source of cohesion, also in those firms that adopt radical decentralizing exercises.  
Perhaps it is the only source left.  
 Another common error that a focus on common knowledge helps to expose 
relates to contemporary knowledge management exercises, in particular to the 
tendency of thinking that technology can replace face to face contact.   This line of 
thinking has become influential, because it seemingly helps to drastically cut 
travel budgets, reduce the opportunity costs of meeting activity, etc., because 
knowledge sharing technology apparently helps people to share knowledge 
without having to be in the same place.   As Nancy Dixon (2000: 4) laconically 
observes, “[a]lthough this sounds reasonable, it unfortunately just doesn’t always 
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work out that way.”  She finds that the knowledge management systems she 
studies unavoidably gravitates towards a mix of technology and face-to-face 
meetings.  In her story, one of the causes of this is that much knowledge is tacit, 
and hence not directly given to transfer through existing knowledge 
management technologies.    A common knowledge perspective suggests a 
different explanation.  Thus, if knowledge is placed in a central “storehouse,” 
employee A may know that a particular piece of information is located there, for 
example, because he himself supplied it.  He also knows that all other employees 
may retrieve it.  But he doesn’t know whether they retrieved it, that is, whether 
they, in fact, know.    And even if he guesses that they know, how does he know 
that they know that he knows.  Well, he does not.  Only more direct contact, and 
preferably direct meetings, can guarantee this kind of common knowledge.  The 
implication is that knowledge that it is crucial that all employees know and 
where coordination requirements necessitate that all know that all know should 
not be disseminated through conventional knowledge management techniques.   
  
Conclusions: Creating Value in a Networked Economy 
I began by noting that beliefs have been given scant attention in the strategy 
discipline, a rather surprising fact, given their obvious importance. Strategy 
theorists have apparently been content to leave the issues of belief management 
to marketing specialists, organizational psychologists, etc.  Although this paper 
represents only a small first stab at the issues, its messages are hopefully clear.   
To repeat some of the main messages.  
 Connectivity means coordination problems. I have argued that as we enter 
an economy that is increasingly, information-rich and networked, coordination 
problems will become increasingly prevalent.  Often these coordination problem 
arise because of network externalities and critical mass effects  phenomena that 
have often been discussed in connection with IT markets.  However, these 
coordination problems are becoming ubiquitious, and not just limited to IT 
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markets, as connectivity becomes equally ubiquitiuous. For example, it was 
argued that they arise for certain classes of consumer goods.   
 Nothing mysterious about it. Influencing beliefs to your advantage is not a 
mysterious process per se, although it may look that way.  Theory tells us that 
when many persons are confronted with a coordination problem, leadership may 
be exercised by means of creating conditions of common knowledge.  For some 
classes of products and services  what was called “coordination goods”  
building critical mass is crucial.  Building that mass may require belief 
management amounting to the creation of common knowledge.  
 Gaining advantage.  There are numerous ways in which you may influence 
beliefs to your advantage.  This goes both for influencing your environment and 
for influencing the people in your organization.  With respect to influencing your 
environment, you can gain advantage by more accurately understanding the 
coordination aspects of the products and services you offer and the motives of 
your customers. Various existing marketing tactics are cast in a different light 
and reinterpreted in a common knowledge perspective as sources of advantage.  
With respect to the issue of influencing people in the organization, a common 
knowledge perspective suggests the importance of building a true “corporate 
religion,” not just a fundamentally non-committing value base.  And it tells you 
what kind of knowledge may be subject to knowledge management exercises and 
which kind of knowledge is best communicated through face-to-face contact. 
 The common knowledge perspective is a new perspective to strategic 
management. It forges link to strategic marketing and to human resource 
management.  Yet, it is consistent with existing approaches.  For example, the 
ability to influence beliefs in a way that favorable to you is, of course, both 
valuable and scarce resource.  Not everybody are equally good at it.  It is also likely 
costly to imitate, although sometimes some belief management tactics may be 
imitated.  For example, after Apple had launched the Mac in 1984 at the Super 
Bowl transmissions, numerous other producers of coordination goods followed 
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suit.  Thus, the common knowledge perspective is entirely consistent with 
resource-based logic (Barney 1991) and in fact helps to bring that perspective into 
the contemporary knowledge and information-based economy.      
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